The Information Policy Agenda in East Asia
The goals of information policy are remarkably similar throughout the world. The mechanisms chosen to achieve these goals, however, differ widely. In the West the mechanisms are determined by the prevailing free-market economic and political philosophy. They depend on the profit motive, competition and de-regulation. In East Asia a different policy agenda is emerging. Here the emphasis is on partnership between the state and the private sector with the state taking the lead in the formulation of policy and in financing investment in the infrastructure. Competition is managed and regulated.
These two approaches accommodate different economic, social and political conditions. The evidence seems to suggest that the policy-driven agenda of East Asia is likely to be more successful than the market-driven approach of the West.
The smooth and effective transition towards the information society is one of the most important tasks that should be undertaken in the last decade of the 20th century (1)
In February 1995 the leaders of the G7 nations met at the European Commission to discuss the steps needed to create a global information society. The remark quoted above provides an indication of the importance that this meeting gave to the matter.
Throughout the world, countries are setting out policy agendas that will enable them to take advantage of the opportunities that will be offered by the use of information in the future. The goals of these policies are remarkably similar. Broadly they seek to create infrastructures that will enable information to flow efficiently and cheaply. They encourage commerce and industry to use this information as a resource to improve productivity and to compete in global markets. They attempt to develop education and training so that there is a ready supply of appropriately skilled people. Most countries go further and attempt to support the development of the information services sector to meet the growing demand for information. Some countries also seek to develop broader social, cultural and political policies that will give a real shape to the information societies of the future.
There is little argument about the policy goals. There are, however, wide differences in the mechanisms that have been chosen to achieve the goals.
The West: Market led policies
In the West, by which we mean principally the USA, Canada and the member states in the European Union, the motivation for the policies comes from a fear of industrial decline and loss of leadership within the global economy. There is a real concern that high levels of unemployment and the increasing gap between the incomes of those in work and those without are leading to the fragmentation of communities and societies. Industries that once led the world are facing harsher competition from the emerging nations around the Pacific Rim. There is a general feeling that the new information technologies need to be embraced as a means of reversing this process of industrial decline.
In the West, the profit motive is seen as the principal means of bringing about the changes that are needed. Investment decisions are made on the basis of entrepreneurial estimates of future rates of return on capital. There is little role for the state other than as a means of facilitating private sector activity. The focus is instead on market forces and the operation of markets. Competition is to be encouraged and, to achieve this, regulations must be removed. In all this, people are seen as consumers rather than as individuals that may have a stake in the form of society that might emerge.
The East: Policy driven
In East Asia the impetus for the development of information policies comes as a logical consequence of growth and expansion. The concern is to maintain the pace of economic growth by moving into a new era of high value-added economic activity. Information is seen as a resource that will not only improve the productivity of industry and commerce, but that will also permit the evolution of new industries. The information services sector is increasingly seen as one of those new industries.
There are many differences between the industrial policy approach in the East Asia region. There is, however, a unifying theme - the idea that partnership between the state and the private sector holds the key to sustainable economic development. This means that there is a very significant role for the state. It is the task of the state to plan and, in large part, to finance the building of the infrastructure. The state also has a crucial role in supporting the development of the private sector. This is done in many different ways, ranging from fiscal policies that favour investment and research through to procurement policies and the direct funding of research and development activity.
The East Asian countries view regulation in a much more positive light than in the West. For them, regulation is an important means of attaining policy goals. One such goal is the provision of universal service. In all the countries there is a firm belief that telecommunications and other parts of the infrastructure should be universally available - this is particularly important in countries like Thailand that are seeking to erode the income differences between the urban and rural areas. It is almost impossible to insist on universal availability in a de-regulated system which is governed by the rules of a free market. Through the creative use of regulation, however, it is possible for the state to ensure that it achieves its goal of ensuring that everyone has access to the infrastructure.
There are two other defining characteristics of the information policies that are emerging from East Asia. The first is a strong belief in the value of competition, but it is a belief moderated by a recognition that, in many circumstances, competition needs to be managed. Secondly there is a concern to develop people, through basic education as well as training, to be active participants in the information society rather than simply to act as passive consumers. This is by no means common to all the East Asian countries, but it is a definite feature of the information policies of Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
The future
The differences in approach between the information policies of the West and those coming out of East Asia are important. The ways in which we shape and position our economies and our societies will, to a very great extent, determine our future prosperity. Already the gross domestic product per capita in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Singapore exceeds that in Britain. And Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand are coming up very quickly. China is set to become the world's largest economy in the relatively near future. These countries will be competing very hard in global markets that have, until now, been dominated by the West. If we lose our share of these global markets then the consequences for economic prosperity and for social cohesion are serious.
We need to study the East Asian approach and to consider whether our prescriptions or theirs are more likely to achieve the goals to which we all aspire.
The state
In the West, attitudes towards the role of the state vary from the lukewarm to the sceptical. In Britain, there is a perception, borne of 15 years of free-market ideology, that it is the private sector, not the state, that will determine the shape of things to come. The British government's view was articulated by Michael Heseltine:
In the development of the Information Society, we have to recognise that the private sector has a very important part to play. It has the resources to build the superhighways, the inventive spirit to develop new and exciting applications and the entrepreneurial flair to market services to customer. ... But government still has a number of crucial roles to play: in providing leadership; in encouraging the best conditions for the developments of markets; and in acting as an intelligent user of the new technology. (2)
The approach adopted by Bill Clinton and Al Gore in the US was more dynamic but even here the Republicans in Congress are severely limiting the scope for future government action. In Europe the Commission has been more assertive, identifying policy goals and objectives and funding basic research but relying on the private sector and market forces to make the investments and to deliver the results (3).
In East Asia there is a much stronger sense of partnership between the state and the private sector. In Hong Kong market forces are paramount, but Hong Kong is the exception that proves the rule. In all other countries the state has established the policies and created a framework within which the private sector has developed. The key in all these countries is a strong industrial policy backed by the resources of the state.
In centralist economies like China and Vietnam, with a background of central planning on the Soviet model, the role of the state is obvious. Here it is a case of moving from centralised planning and state control to an arrangement which opens up the national market to local and foreign capital. In such countries the state still sets the parameters within which private capital operates.
In more overtly capitalist countries like Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore the state still plays a significant role. There are many reasons for this. The newly industrialised countries like Korea and Malaysia have required a framework of industrial policies to enable them to build, or in the case of Japan, to re-build, local industries. There has been a strong tendency towards protectionism and state assistance to support the development of industries and to nurture them until they are able to compete in global markets. There has been a constant worry about the threat of external competition - a concern that still exists even in Japan. Some in the West feel that this is irrational. But weak indigenous industries feel justifiably nervous when faced with competition from well-established multi-national industrial combines that have grown strong on the basis of a large, homogeneous home market.
This overall industrial policy approach has been applied to the development of policies to support the information sector. Here it is possible to see a pattern. The state sets the overall strategic direction and works towards the creation of a framework within which the private sector can develop. In Malaysia, for example, Dr Mahathir, the Prime Minister set out an ambitious plan to develop the multimedia industries as a key sector in the future economic growth of the country. He set out a vision of the future. To achieve this Malaysia has created the Multimedia Development Corporation which will operate from the Prime Minister's Department: 'Coordination is necessary as multimedia touches upon many kinds of information infrastructure and information content. The Multimedia Development Corporation will be the master planner and the strategic arm for the creation of the multimedia society.' (4).
In Singapore we can see the steady move towards the creation of an Intelligent Island. Here policy and strategic direction came from the government which established a range of programmes and activities designed to lead the private sector into what has become a mutually beneficial and profitable partnership.
Similar approaches can be seen in both Thailand and Korea. The state set the goal and articulates the vision. It then backs this with a range of policies and programmes that are designed to use the power of government and the public sector not to supplant the private sector but to foster and develop it. The precise nature of the support provided changes over time as circumstances change. In Japan, for example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry has announced a range of support measures focused on the information sector as a means of helping the private sector to move out of recession. Far from cutting public expenditure, their approach is to spend more to kick-start the economy and to encourage investment in the industries of tomorrow.
The result is that industrial development is driven by policy rather than being led by market forces.
Competition
A belief in the virtues of competition is implicit in the free market economic philosophies of the West. Here, it is argued, competition encourages innovation, and maintains a continual downward pressure on prices. All this is true. But, while there are positive benefits that arise from competition, there are also undesirable consequences.
Competition favours the strong at the expense of the weak. If companies of equal size compete in a near-perfect market, then they will tend to be innovative and there will be considerable pressure to keep prices low. The situation is, however, very different if the market is dominated by a one or two powerful players which can use their market strength to force weaker companies out of business. Such strong players can also prevent new companies from entering the market. None of this is new or revolutionary. Such conditions apply to all markets and they are the reason why most markets are controlled and regulated in some way. In the USA, for example, there is a complex web of laws and regulations that seek to ensure that competition is fair and that powerful companies are not able to use, or abuse, their market position to the detriment of other players.
In global markets there is more scope for the powerful to use their position at the expense of the weak. Individual countries have to rely on their own systems of protection - and these can often work against the long-term interests of industries in the home country - or on terms established under the GATT and now the WTO which tend to be biased towards the interests of the major trading nations.
It is not, therefore, surprising that large information suppliers advocate free and open competition in global markets. It is particularly understandable if the suppliers have the advantage of a large, homogenous, English-speaking home market protected by anti-trust legislation, within which they can develop their products. Such suppliers are then in a very strong position when they enter global markets. They can set their export prices at the level of a low marginal cost. Of course they want free and open competition. They will, almost certainly be the winners.
But view the situation from the perspective of information providers in a small country like Singapore. The home market is small. Information products benefit greatly from the scale economies that apply in large markets, but the only way in which suppliers in small countries can take advantage of scale economies is through participation in global markets. And, as we have seen, global markets tend to put small countries at a disadvantage.
Or consider the position of information companies in a country like Vietnam. The potential home market is similar in size to the UK. But it is un-developed. The real home market is much smaller. And it is a market that speaks a language spoken by no other country in the world. If they want to develop information products, not only must their companies trade against well-established firms in fiercely competitive global markets but they must do so in a foreign language. How many British information providers would be able to develop their business if they had to produce everything in Vietnamese?
Within East Asia there is a recognition that companies need time and space to grow before they can compete effectively. This is particularly true in circumstances where the home market is small or where the home language is anything other than English.
The traditional approach in such circumstances is to protect local industries during their formative years through tariff barriers. This is no longer a viable option. Information is easily traded between countries and no single country can afford to be excluded from access to the global information system. The difficult task is, therefore, to open access to the global system so that industry as a whole can benefit, while protecting emerging local information companies and so preventing them from being overwhelmed by the multinational information companies.
There are several strategies that the state can adopt to provide support. The state can purchase services from local suppliers, using procurement policies to provide a guaranteed demand for the local products. The state can also provide fiscal and other financial support to strengthen emerging companies. In Japan, for example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry underwrites the investment plans of multimedia information companies. The investment finance comes from the Japanese banking system - MITI simply guarantees or insures the investment. Another way to support local services is for the state to create a demand for local products. In Singapore in the early 1980s, for example, the government decided to introduce information technology into all parts of the public sector. In this way they created a demand for a whole range of local companies providing services to support the 'informatisation' of government. Many of the companies that were formed during that period are now competing successfully in global markets.
Not surprisingly, the attitude in the East is that competition is a powerful force but one that needs to be managed In Malaysia, for example, they needed to develop their mobile telecommunication services. To do this they followed the example of the West and opened up the market to a number of companies. The idea was that competition would be the best way of stimulating investment and the development of new services. Eight companies received licences to operate mobile telephones. They compete fiercely but the market is not sufficiently large to provide the necessary economies of scale for any single company. So mobile telephone services are cheap and plentiful in the large cities. But the quality of service is very poor. And there is almost no service at all in the remote rural areas. The solution now being pursued is to reduce the number of suppliers. Competition and market forces would almost certainly do this without government intervention. But at what cost? The feeling in Malaysia is that the rapidly expanding economy cannot afford to wait while market forces sort out mobile telecoms. The government should do it instead and do it quickly.
In other instances, it is only practical to operate services on a monopoly basis. This is particularly true in the case of the information infrastructure. It is hard enough to justify the investment in a single rural telecommunications system. It would never be possible to justify investing in enough systems to ensure effective competition. The infrastructure is only viable if it is in a monopoly position. Thus we have what are known as natural monopolies. It is only through accepting such monopolies that it becomes possible to enforce a principle of universal service.
But monopolies are anathema to competition. In order to obtain the benefits that competition can bring, it is, therefore necessary to introduce some form of competitive arrangement. Monopoly providers of the infrastructure can be required to make the infrastructure available to other suppliers. This was the approach adopted when British Telecom was opened up to competition from Mercury. The trouble with arrangements like this is that they encourage cherry-pickers - companies that will happily compete for the high-profit services, leaving the monopoly provider to carry the cost of providing universal service. This tendency is exacerbated by the universal service ethos which demands that prices are uniform throughout the country. So it becomes necessary to manage the competition through regulation. Britain has opened up the telecommunications market to competition but has had to put in place a fairly fierce system of regulation.
The alternative approach, which tends to be favoured in the East, is for the state to retain ownership of the infrastructure and to use the forces of competition to obtain benefits in the construction and, occasionally in the operation of the infrastructure. In Thailand, for example, the state retains ownership of the telecoms system but construction companies compete fiercely to bid for the work of building the infrastructure.
One's attitude to competition depends greatly on one's point of view. Before the contest David almost certainly had a more ambivalent attitude than did Goliath.
Regulation
Closely associated with competition is de-regulation. This is advocated as a means of opening up markets to increase competition. This again, favours the strong at the expense of the weak. Even in the most free-market economies, such as the USA, regulation is a fact of life despite all that we read and hear. The world's most competitive markets - stock exchanges and foreign exchange markets - depend on strong regulatory frameworks for their effective operation.
In East Asia regulation is viewed positively as an important policy instrument. It is a means of managing competition by curbing the natural inclinations of the strong and providing a degree of protection for the weak. This can simply mean ensuring that there is free and fair competition, or it can go further and offer emergent local industries a period of protection during which they can grow before exposing them to international competition.
Regulation also provides a means of achieving a number of other policy goals including standardisation, universal service and open access to networks. In most cases, the state assumes the role of regulator, often operating within internationally-agreed norms and procedures. There is little evidence of self-regulation by the industry or of the currently-fashionable British practice of appointing regulators that are independent of both the government and the industry.
Public or private sector finance
The emphasis in the West is very firmly on private sector finance. This is the clear message to emerge from the G7 meeting (1), from the National Information Infrastructure work in the US (5) and from the Bangemann report for the European Council (3). The private sector is expected to find the greatest part of the investment capital required to develop the infrastructure. The private sector is also perceived to be the main engine powering the development of the products and services that will be required to exploit the opportunities offered by the infrastructure. The role of the public sector is simply to create the conditions that will permit these market forces to flourish.
In this, the information policies simply reflect the prevalent economic and political philosophy which dominates the thinking of conservative governments of North America and Europe. The aim is to reduce public sector expenditure as much as possible, thus reducing the tax burden and so freeing resources for both consumption and for savings, and thus investment. Once these conditions have been met, it is possible to rely on market forces to stimulate the development of new firms and products. Investment will follow naturally as expected rates of return on capital increase.
It is perhaps in this area that the contrast is greatest between East and West. In East Asia there is a widespread recognition of the need for public sector finance. Even in the countries that are most overtly capitalist - Japan, Korea and Taiwan, for example, the government is seen as having an important role in stimulating the workings of the capitalist machine.
At the most basic level the state has the responsibility for building public infrastructures. Roads, railways, airports, power lines and telecommunications networks - in all of these areas the state assumes responsibility and finances the building of the infrastructure needed by the rest of the economy and the community. In most cases, once built, the state retains ownership and operational control of the infrastructure although there is increasing interest in privatisation and in licensing arrangements. In this respect, the Far Eastern governments are conforming to a well-established model. In the West, most of the infrastructure was built by the state using public funds. It is only relatively recently that the private sector has been seen as having a role to play and even here, the examples are limited - the private sector has been fairly reluctant to become involved in building roads and railways - one only has to think of the Channel tunnel rail link.
But the belief in public finance extends well beyond the infrastructure. Public money is seen to play an important part in the process of creating industries that will underpin wider economic development. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan, for example, has just financed the creation of the Multimedia Research Institute to conduct the basic and applied research that will enable the Japanese multimedia producers to stay fully abreast of the latest developments.
In Korea and in Singapore, the governments are financing the development of a range of network services that will bring wider social and cultural benefits. In this the state is simply funding services that will provide a public good, such as the Korean network linking researchers in academic institutions with their colleagues working in industry, or the Singaporean network linking medical practitioners. But the activity is also helping to stimulate the demand for services and products that will be provided by information suppliers based firmly in the private sector. It is using public money to stimulate demand and thus to encourage the development of the private sector suppliers.
It is also possible to use public money to make good deficiencies of the private sector. We have already seen that MITI in Japan underwrites or guarantees private sector investment in information suppliers on the grounds that the markets are not yet sufficiently stable for commercial investment decisions to be made with any degree of confidence.
The neo-Keynesian approach to economic policy, which is such a significant feature of the expanding economies of East Asia is one that has been firmly rejected by the governments of the West over the last 15 years. Yet there seems to be growing evidence to suggest that the alternative has failed to deliver all that was expected of it (6)
Infrastructure development
In the West, much of the information infrastructure exists. We have telecommunications networks that provide an almost universal service throughout Europe. They need to be upgraded, but the important point is that the basis exists already. We have high levels of literacy, a relatively high level of awareness of information and high levels of penetration of personal computers. We have a well-established publishing industry, stable broadcasting institutions and a networks of laws to protect intellectual property rights. We cannot be complacent but we must recognise that we are in a fortunate position. Many of the pre-requisites for the creation of an information society are in place.
In East Asia, however, much of the infrastructure still needs to be built. Circumstances vary considerably. Countries like Japan are in a very similar position to those in Europe. Singapore is way ahead of the field, while others, like Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Vietnam and parts of China have a very long way to go. In such circumstances some policy objectives assume much more importance than they do in the West. The principle of universal service, for example, is clearly of great importance in a country like Thailand which has a telecommunications network that fails to reach a large number of the rural communities. Also, in countries that have a large proportion of young people in their population educational development is seen as a very important element in the process of building the infrastructure.
So, the emphasis is on basic construction rather than on up-grading an existing system. This increases the costs considerably. It also, however, provides countries with an opportunity to leap-frog technologies and to install systems that make full use of the most recent technology. In China, for example, they are creating a telecommunications infrastructure that is one of the most modern in the World. It is still far from providing universal service but technologically it is more advanced than in many Western countries.
There is also much more pressure on the governments in East Asia to get on with the job of building the infrastructure. The economies are growing at a dramatic rate. This puts considerable pressure on the existing infrastructure, creating bottle-necks, delays and inefficiencies. Whether it is traffic jams in Jakarta and Bangkok, or problems with getting telephone lines in Shanghai and Ho Chi Minh City, the pressure is the same. In contrast, in the West, by and large, we can make do with what we have got.
People
One of the consequences of the Western approach to the information society is the fact that people are regarded as consumers rather than as active participants in the process of creating the new society. We will be purchasers of the products produced mainly by the private sector. Implicitly, we will be passive recipients of what it is deemed to be worth selling to us. We may be able to influence commercial decisions by rejecting what is offered to us - the recent experiments in video-on-demand may be an example of this rejection - but we have relatively little power to shape what we receive.
The rhetoric suggests that products must be developed to fit consumer requirements. But evidence points in the other direction. Consumer preferences and demands can be manipulated and market forces can be used to create artificially strong markets. One only has to look at the progress of News International to become aware of how it is possible for a supplier to shape the market for its products.
One response to this set of circumstances is the notion that we need to educate people to be more effective users of both the technology and the services that it will provide. Anyone who has recent experience of setting up a video recorder can testify to the extent to which we have to accommodate our inclinations and expectations to those of the manufacturers.
The other consequence in the West is that there is little interest in the impact that information can have on social and political life. In the European Union, for example, the current work on the social and economic impact of the information society has come as an after-thought, driven, I suspect, largely by the more socially-aware attitudes that are a feature of the newer members of the Union. Even here the emphasis is still on the economic consequences and on the effect on employment conditions.
There are many similarities in the East. This is particularly true with a lack of awareness of social and political dimension. There are, however, exceptions. In Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand there is a discernable recognition that people are players in the process of developing the future information society. So, we see in Japan and Korea an emphasis on basic education to develop computer and information literacy at a very young age and to do so in ways that are sufficiently flexible to equip individuals with the capacity to cope with whatever is the predominant form of the technology when they become adults.
In Singapore they have created further and higher education institutions that are equipping people with high-level skills and they are fostering a culture that encourages constant re-training and re-education. They are developing a highly sophisticated public library and information system and in various other ways they are encouraging Singaporeans to make sophisticated use of information in all walks of life.
In Thailand they are at an earlier stage in the development process. Here the emphasis is again on education and on the use of information and communications technology not only to deliver education but to do so in ways that will foster familiarity and breed confidence. The goal appears to be to educate creators and contributors, not just consumers.
Over-laying this is an attempt to preserve a distinctive Asian culture. Leading figures such as Dr Mahathir in Malaysia, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore and Suharto in Indonesia all share a deeply-felt belief in the virtues of Asian values and Asian culture. They have noted many of the less attractive aspects of Western culture and they are determined to do all they can to avoid becoming subsumed in an international or, actually, a North American culture that erodes many of the values that they believe have contributed to their present success. In the short-term they can set up barriers to prevent the importation of the more extreme forms of Western culture. But they recognise that the technology is making it increasingly difficult to maintain the barriers. In the long-term the solution lies in strengthening the Asian value system and in developing information societies that are self-sustaining rather than dependent on the offerings of the West. This implies the creation of a population that are active participants rather than passive consumers.
Conclusion
Which approach is likely to be most successful in the long-term?
To begin to answer that question it is important to remember different circumstances within which the policy goals have been formulated. In the West the motivation comes from an attempt to reverse industrial decline and to reduce unemployment. Governments in North America and Europe have an established information infrastructure and developed industrial structures upon which they can build.
In the East the motivation comes from an attempt to maintain the pace of development and to move into the next wave of economic expansion. Here it is, or has until recently been, necessary to create infrastructures and industries from scratch. And to do so in circumstances of fierce international competition.
Can we learn anything from recent history that will help us to answer the question?
The last 15 years in the West suggest that free markets have done little to encourage steady growth. Economic cycles seem to be getting more severe. Recession has been a recurring feature of Western economies. In particular, the freeing up of markets and increased competition has led to short-termism and to a preference for quick gains as opposed to long-term investment
There are also the inherent contradictions in free markets and broader policy goals: the conflict between competition, de-regulation and the notion of universal service is only one example.
Progress has also not been especially good on the social, cultural and educational front either. We seem to have less social cohesion and more social problems. We have certainly failed to overcome the problems of poverty. Our cultural identity in Europe is under greater threat than ever before as we become more heavily influenced by the culture of North America. And we are falling behind in the educational race.
In contrast, the different industrial policies that have been followed the East over the last 15 years have produced high and apparently sustainable levels of economic growth as Table 1 shows.
| Country | Total GDP 1992 (US$bn) | Average annual growth in GDP (%) | Average annual growth in exports (%) |
| China | 506 | 9.1 | 11.9 |
| Hong Kong | 78 | 6.7 | 5.0 |
| Indonesia | 126 | 5.7 | 5.6 |
| Japan | 3,671 | 4.1 | 4.6 |
| Malaysia | 58 | 5.9 | 11.3 |
| Philippines | 52 | 1.2 | 3.7 |
| Singapore | 46 | 6.7 | 9.9 |
| South Korea | 296 | 9.4 | 7.0 |
| Taiwan | 196 | 10.6 | 5.6 |
| Thailand | 110 | 8.2 | 14.7 |
I can find no reason to believe that impact of these economic policies on the information sector will be any different. I think that the economies of East Asia will become more information-intensive. In the short-term this will provide a market opportunity for information providers in the West. But in the medium- and certainly the long-term, information suppliers from East Asia will eat into our share of global markets and we will arrive at a position where we become net importers of information from East Asia. What happened to the European motorcycle industry and what is currently happening to the banking industry, will happen to the information industry.
References
- Communiqé following the Ministerial Conference of the G-7 Nations on the Information Society, Brussels, European Commission, 1995
- Speech by Michael Heseltine when President of the Board of Trade, June 1995
- High Level Group on the Information Society (1994) Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations to the European Council, Brussels, European Council
- Speech by Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1 November 1995
- National Information Infrastructure (NII): and agenda for action. 1993
- See, for example, Hutton, Will (1995) The state we're in. London, Jonathon Cape